WIKI LEAKS SECRET --- 08NEWDELHI3228

Tuesday, 23 December 2008, 13:26
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003228
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/22/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, KISL, IN
SUBJECT: CONGRESS PARTY STUNG PLAYING RELIGIOUS POLITICS
WITH TERRORISM
REF: MUMBAI 518
Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
¶1. (C) Summary: On the floor of parliament, Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram officially dismissed comments made by the Minority Affairs Minister A.R. Antulay that implied Hindutva elements may have been involved in the Mumbai attacks. Antulay sparked a political controversy on December 17 with comments insinuating that the killing of Maharashtra Anti-Terror Squad (ATS) Chief Hemant Karkare by the Mumbai terrorists was somehow linked to Karkare’s investigation of bombings in which radical Hindus are suspected (reftel). The outlandish comments suggested that somehow Hindutva elements were in league with the Mumbai attackers, or used the attacks as cover to kill Karkare. The opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) immediately called for Antulay’s resignation and protested with boisterous walkouts in parliament over the course of five days. Compounding matters, the Congress Party, after first distancing itself from the comments, two days later issued a contradictory statement which implicitly endorsed the conspiracy. During this time, Antulay’s completely unsubstantiated claims gained support in the conspiracy-minded Indian-Muslim community. Hoping to foster that support for upcoming national elections, the Congress Party cynically pulled back from its original dismissal and lent credence to the conspiracy. Regardless of Chidambaram’s dismissal (and Antulay’s party-ordered retraction), the Indian Muslim community will continue to believe they are unfairly targeted by law enforcement and that those who investigate the truth are silenced. The entire episode demonstrates that the Congress Party will readily stoop to the old caste/religious-based politics if it feels it is in its interest. End Summary.
Killed in Mumbai Attacks, Karkare Led Investigation into “Hindu Terror”
---------------------------------------------
¶2. (U) Indian Minorities Affairs Minister A.R. Antulay’s sparked controversy on December 17 with comments insinuating that the killing of Maharashtra Anti-Terror Squad (ATS) Chief Hemant Karkare by the Mumbai terrorists was somehow linked to Karkare’s investigation of “Hindu terrorists.” Two of the Mumbai terrorists gunned down Karkare, and his ATS colleagues Additional Commissioner of Police Ashok Kamte and Inspector Vijay Salaskar the first night of attacks, November 26. The three officers were killed as they reached a hospital the terrorists entered after attacking the Mumbai train station.
¶3. (U) As Maharashtra ATS Chief, Karkare led the investigation into the September 2008 Malegaon blasts which claimed the lives of six people. Initially the police suspected Muslim terrorists. However, authorities recently arrested eleven Hindus, including an Indian Army Lieutenant Colonel. Police identified five of those arrested as having ties to the BJP’s youth wing in their earlier years. Two others had ties to a recent addition to the Sangh Parivar family of Hindu nationalist organizations.
Antulay’s Comments
------------------
¶4. (U) On December 17, even as a solemn debate on the Mumbai attacks and counterterrorism was taking place in parliament, Antulay made a series of public comments drawing attention to a possible link between Karkare’s killing and his investigation. He offered no evidence to back-up his claims.
-- “Superficially speaking they had no reason to kill Karkare. Whether he was a victim of terrorism or terrorism plus something, I do not know.”
-- “Karkare found that there are non Muslims involved in the
NEW DELHI 00003228 002 OF 002
acts of terrorism during his investigations in some cases. Any person going to the roots of terrorism has always been the target.”
-- “Unfortunately his end came. It may be a separate inquiry how his end came.”
-- “There is more than what meets the eyes.”
Congress Party Dismisses...
---------------------------
¶5. (U) Most Congress Party leaders quickly disassociated the Party from Atulay’s comments. Congress Party spokesman Abishek Singhvi told the press, “We do not accept the innuendo and the aspersions cast. This should be the end of the matter. The Congress does not agree with Antulay’s statement.” Another Congress Party spokesman, Manish Tiwari, followed the next day with, “The Congress in any manner does not endorse Antulay’s views.” Just as quickly BJP leaders called for Antulay to resign or be sacked.
...Then Equivocates...
----------------------
¶6. (U) However, on December 21 senior Congress leader Digvijay Singh told the media, “I don’t think Antulay made a mistake. What he asked for is a probe. What is objectionable in his statement?” Two days earlier the Congress-led government of Maharashtra rejected a demand for an inquiry into Karkare’s death. The opposition BJP took exception to both the substance of Antulay’s comments and the Congress Party’s inconsistent response. Shouting slogans, the BJP staged a walkout in the parliament three days in a row and demanded a formal clarification from the government. Emboldened by the equivocation, Antulay refused to apologize or retract his statements and said they reflected the views of a large segment of the Muslim population.
...And Finally Dismisses
------------------------
¶7. (U) After taking flack for nearly a week, the Congress Party finally gave its official view when Home Minister Chidambaram stated in parliament, “There is no truth whatsoever in the suspicion that there was conspiracy.” Chidambaram called Antulay’s comments “regrettable.” Shortly thereafter Antulay backed down and told the press, “For me the matter is settled.” He ruled out his resignation.
Congress Party Plays Cynical Politics
-------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Comment: While the killing of three high level law enforcement officers during the Mumbai attacks is a remarkable coincidence, the Congress Party’s initial reaction to Antulay’s outrageous comments was correct. But as support seemed to swell among Muslims for Antulay’s unsubstantiated claims, crass political opportunism swayed the thinking of some Congress Party leaders. What’s more, the party made the cynical political calculation to lend credence to the conspiracy even after its recent emboldening state elections victories. The party chose to pander to Muslims’ fears, providing impetus for those in the Muslim community who will continue to play up the conspiracy theory. While cooler heads eventually prevailed within the Congress leadership, the idea that the party would entertain such outlandish claims proved once again that many party leaders are still wedded to the old identity politics. The seventy-nine year old Antulay was probably bewildered to find that his remarks, similar in vein to what he would have routinely made in the past to attack the BJP, created such a furor this time. End Comment. MULFORD

WIKI LEAKS INDIA --- 09NEWDELHI1337

Monday, 29 June 2009, 05:53

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001337

SIPDIS

NSC ANISH GOEL

EO 12958 DECL: 06/26/2019

TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK, AG, IN

SUBJECT: NSA JONES DISCUSSES U.S.-INDIA SECURITY

RELATIONSHIP AND PAKISTAN WITH DEFENSE MINISTER ANTONY

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Peter Burleigh for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

¶1. (C) Summary. Meeting National Security Advisor James Jones on June 26, Defense Minister A.K. Antony stressed his support for moving beyond minor irritants and to a broad and expanded security relationship between India and the United States. Both Jones and Antony affirmed their commitment to building the U.S.-India mil-mil partnership as envisioned by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh. Antony stressed the importance India places on success in Afghanistan. Chief of Army Staff Deepak Kapoor told Jones about the continuing problem of infiltration from Pakistan and the need for India to be able to have confidence and trust in its western neighbor for effective dialogue to take place. End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) Participants:

NSA General (retired) James Jones CDA Peter Burleigh Senior Director Don Camp Senior Director John Tien Senior Advisor Sarah Farnsworth DATT Colonel Richard White Political Officer Sameer Sheth (notetaker)

Minister A.K. Antony Chief of Army Staff, General Deepak Kapoor Other Ministry of Defense Officials

Need to Move Beyond Minor Irritants

----

¶3. (C) After warmly welcoming Jones, Antony began by emphasizing the importance of expanding the quality and depth of the U.S.-India relationship. He stressed his desire to expand the bilateral military relationship despite minor irritants, and expressed his hope that Jones’ visit to India would further the relationship. Antony mentioned joint development and production, and technology transfers as meriting focus, adding that the Indians find U.S. technology transfer conditions too restrictive. Jones and Burleigh urged completion of the End-Use Monitoring agreement. Antony said it needed to be defensible to Parliament, musing that he himself is accountable to parliament and to India’s vibrant and multi-party democracy.

¶4. (C) Jones declared to Antony that he is very encouraged by the overall direction of the bilateral relationship, especially after having met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who had expressed his optimism for U.S.-India relations. Jones told Antony the U.S. is in complete agreement with the Prime Minister’s vision, emphasizing that President Obama is also equally committed to strong ties between the two nations. “There is real intent to follow the vision of our national leaders,” Jones noted. He assured Antony that the U.S. will be as flexible as possible within the confines of U.S. laws, Indian laws, and both our publics. We must do whatever we can to resolve the challenges that can potentially slow the relationship down, since these are sensitive times that require both nations to find ways to more closely cooperate.

Success in Afghanistan Critical

----

¶5. (C) Antony told Jones India has a stake in Afghanistan, reminding him that India’s borders before partition extended to Afghanistan. The Indian military is concerned by the situation in Afghanistan, Antony admitted, and stressed that the international community’s operations there must succeed because the India cannot imagine for a moment a Taliban takeover of its “extended neighbor.”

Pakistan: Infiltration Continues/Trust Deficit Remains

----

¶6. (S) After the conversation moved to Pakistan, General Deepak Kapoor, Chief of Army Staff, interjected and told Jones the Pakistani military’s statements regarding the Indian threat on its eastern border are wholly without merit. Even after the 11/26 terrorist strikes on Mumbai, he emphasized, India did not make any move of a threatening nature toward Pakistan. Kapoor alleged that there are 43 terrorist camps in Pakistan, 22 of which are located in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Although the Pakistanis raided some camps in the wake of 11/26, Kapoor averred, some camps have reinitiated operations. Kapoor further asserted infiltration across the Line of Control cannot occur unless there is some kind of assistance and/or degree of support that is institutional in nature. He described several incidents of infiltration that occurred this year, including that of 40 terrorists in March who were found possessing significant ammunition and other equipment. India is worried, Kapoor said, that some part of the huge U.S. military package to Pakistan will find its way to the hands of terrorists targeting India. Furthermore, if “we can catch them (the infiltrators), why can’t the Pakistani military?” Kapoor asked. “There’s a trust deficit between the U.S. and Pakistan but there’s also one between India and Pakistan,” he stressed.

¶7. (S) Jones asked Kapoor how the Pakistanis react when the Indians confront them with these incidents. Kapoor replied the Pakistanis remain in denial mode, but fortunately today India’s counter-infiltration posture is stronger than in the past. Asked about the percentage of infiltrators that get through, Kapoor estimated between 15 to 20 percent but cited the challenge posed by India’s open border with Nepal. He asserted that at least 16 terrorists this year entered India through Nepal and then traveled to Kashmir. Throughout his remarks, Kapoor stressed that infiltration bids were “acts of aggression.”

¶8. (S) Jones queried Kapoor on prospects of upgrading Indo-Pak military talks to discuss these issues. Kapoor rhetorically asked whether there should not be a degree of confidence in Pakistan before such a dialogue can even begin. Antony interjected that unless there is some tangible follow-up action by Pakistan against the perpetrators of the 11/26 attacks, discussions with Pakistan will be difficult. Regarding terrorist camps in Pakistan, Jones told Antony and Kapoor that the U.S. will take up the issue with Pakistan.

Regional Problems Require Regional Solutions

-------

¶9. (C) Jones suggested regional problems require regional solutions, underscoring the need for all of us to move forward on a broader strategy by building confidence and trust. The U.S.-India partnership is very important in this context. The worst thing for the region would be another 11/26-type attack, Jones stressed, and that we cannot let the terrorists play us off against each other. He concluded by underscoring President Obama’s desire to stimulate the bilateral relationship and the U.S. commitment to working as honestly as possible to share information with India on security matters.

¶10. (U) NSA Jones cleared this message. BURLEIGH

S E C R E T NEW DELHI 000295

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 10/01/2020

TAGS PREL, PTER, MOPS, IN, PK

SUBJECT: COLD START - A MIXTURE OF MYTH AND REALITY

REF: IIR 6 844 0101 10 (COLD START - A DAO PERSPECTIVE)

Classified By: Ambassador Tim Roemer. Reason: 1.4 (b,d).

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Indian Army’s “Cold Start Doctrine” is a mixture of myth and reality. It has never been and may never be put to use on a battlefield because of substantial and serious resource constraints, but it is a developed operational attack plan announced in 2004 and intended to be taken off the shelf and implemented within a 72-hour period during a crisis. Cold Start is not a plan for a comprehensive invasion and occupation of Pakistan. Instead, it calls for a rapid, time- and distance-limited penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan, possibly in response to a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear response. It was announced by the BJP-led government in 2004, but the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has not publicly embraced Cold Start and GOI uncertainty over Pakistani nuclear restraint may inhibit future implementation by any government. If the GOI were to implement Cold Start given present Indian military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the Mission that India would encounter mixed results. The GOI failed to implement Cold Start in the wake of the audacious November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Mumbai, which calls into question the willingness of the GOI to implement Cold Start in any form and thus roll the nuclear dice. At the same time, the existence of the plan reassures the Indian public and may provide some limited deterrent effect on Pakistan. Taken together, these factors underline that the value of the doctrine to the GOI may lie more in the plan’s existence than in any real world application. End Summary.

What It Is and What It Is Not

-----------------------------

¶2. (S/NF) As we understand it, Cold Start is an operational plan devised by the Indian Army and designed to make a rapid and limited penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan over some event, such as a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear response. Cold Start is not a plan for the comprehensive invasion or occupation of Pakistan. Cold Start is said to have been formulated after the Indian Army’s slow and drawn-out 2002 mobilization in response to the fatal 2001 Pakistan-linked terror attack on the Indian Parliament. The lengthy process of mobilization, lack of strategic and operational flexibility, and the resulting lack of any element of surprise drew criticism from Indian politicians and opinion leaders, which prompted Indian Army planners to devise Cold Start. (See Reftel for further details on Cold Start’s genesis).

¶3. (S/NF) In order to avoid the Indian Army’s slow and lumbering military mobilization process and preserve the element of surprise in attack, Cold Start attacks could begin within 72 hours after the attack order has been given, and would be led by armored spearheads launched from prepared forward positions in Punjab and Rajasthan. As described, the plan emphasizes speed and overwhelming firepower: armored formations and accompanying infantry would advance into eastern Pakistan with limited goals in terms of distance and in terms of duration. Although the plan reportedly has a significant air support component, it is unclear to us how much joint versus parallel planning has taken place. We have not heard of a major operational role for the Indian Navy or parallel sea-launched attacks. (Reftel provides further analysis of the military aspects of Cold Start doctrine and implementation).

¶4. (S/NF) A positive attribute of Cold Start from the Indian perspective is that the short 72-hour time period between decision and attack could shield the GOI from international pressure to refrain from taking military action against Pakistan. India’s prolonged 2002 mobilization period gave the international community notice of Indian troop movements and allowed plenty of time for a series of Western interlocutors to lobby GOI leaders. Even if the plan is never actually implemented -- and there is considerable question as to GOI intent to ever implement it -- news of Cold Start’s existence has already paid dividends to Indian policymakers by providing reassurance to the Indian public that the GOI has the means to punish Pakistan for attacks on Indian soil without triggering potential mutually-assured nuclear destruction. From the Indian perspective, the unimplemented plan has the added virtue of accentuating Pakistani discomfiture and angst, which in theory may have some deterrent value.

Prospects for Cold Start

------------------------

¶5. (S/NF) As noted above, GOI intent to ever actually implement Cold Start is very much an open question. The Cold Start doctrine was announced in April 2004 by the BJP-led government that was replaced shortly thereafter by the Manmohan Singh government, which has not since publicly embraced Cold Start. A political green-light to implement Cold Start, fraught as it is with potential nuclear consequences, would involve a highly opaque decision-making process and would likely necessitate broad political consensus, a factor that could prolong the time between a precipitating event such as a Pakistan-linked terror attack and Cold Start deployment (which in turn could reduce the element of surprise). We lack firm details of the decision-making process that the political leadership would use in the event of an incident that would trigger consideration of Cold Start or other military action against Pakistan. The precise function of the Cabinet Committee on Security in ratifying decisions to take military action, the character of the military’s advisory responsibilities to the Cabinet, the possible ad hoc nature of decision-making in the upper levels of the Indian government and the role of Congress Party figures like Sonia Gandhi in this process are not clearly understood.

¶6. (S/NF) If the GOI were to implement Cold Start given present Indian military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the Mission that India would likely encounter very mixed results. Indian forces could have significant problems consolidating initial gains due to logistical difficulties and slow reinforcement. Reftel sets forth in detail the various resource challenges that India would have to overcome, challenges that range from road and rail transportation to ammunition supply. In addition, Cold Start’s reliance on swift mobile advance would have to contend with a large number of built-up populated areas in Pakistan that the Indian Army did not have to face in 1971, the last time it advanced in force into Pakistani Punjab and Sindh.

¶7. (S/NF) Indian leaders no doubt realize that, although Cold Start is designed to punish Pakistan in a limited manner without triggering a nuclear response, they can not be sure whether Pakistani leaders will in fact refrain from such a response. Even in the absence of a Pakistani nuclear response, GOI leaders are aware also that even a limited Indian incursion into Pakistan will likely lead to international condemnation of Indian action and a resulting loss of the moral high ground that GOI leaders believe India enjoys in its contentious relationship with Pakistan.

Comment

-------

¶8. (S/NF) We think that the November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Mumbai and its immediate aftermath provide insight into Indian and Pakistani thinking on Cold Start. First, the GOI refrained from implementing Cold Start even after an attack as audacious and bloody as the Mumbai attack, which calls into serious question the GOI’s willingness to actually adopt the Cold Start option. Second, the Pakistanis have known about Cold Start since 2004, but this knowledge does not seem to have prompted them to prevent terror attacks against India to extent such attacks could be controlled. This fact calls into question Cold Start’s ability to deter Pakistani mischief inside India. Even more so, it calls into question the degree of sincerity of fear over Cold Start as expressed by Pakistani military leaders to USG officials. Cold Start is not India’s only or preferred option after a terrorist attack. Depending on the nature, location, lethality, public response, and timing of a terrorist attack, India might not respond at all or could pursue one of several other possible options. Finally, several very high level GOI officials have firmly stated, when asked directly about their support for Cold Start, that they have never endorsed, supported, or advocated for this doctrine. One of these officials is former National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, who has recently been replaced. While the army may remain committed to the goals of the doctrine, political support is less clear. ROEMER

training paused!!!!

well my training is on hold for this whole week as there is a regular maintenance work going on which is a part of the regular maintenance system in Maruti Suzuki and the trainees are not allowed to enter the factory!!!

so thought of seeing ravana this week and also planned to visit some of the temples in delhi..

but its so hot there it seems impossible to even come out of the house.

so all in all this week will be very boring!!!!!!!!!

well feeling kinda bored with this kinda hectic life in delhi just need some respite,,, feeling how to over come the burden of training which has not yet started... lets hope for the best,,,,

anyways will be visiting ISKCON temple in lajpat nagar tomorrow,,,,,, try to get the peace in tomorrow..

till then bye :)

well the day was good, was busy yesterday so not able to blog.

having little confidence on the subject now well it is easy.

heard about todays news about indo america bilateral talks but i wonder if america really going to give access to this david coleman headly and wether the whip by the america on the pakistan reallly help.

to my other surprises was the sania mirza's marriage with shoib malik as it was preponed but as promised it was a close affair and media done a very good job on giving small patform to it.

testerday watched the weak that wasn't by cyrus and it was complete hilarious and the best part was when start his pranks on mayawati

but the extraordinary piece of work was done by karan thapar in devils advocate where he debated very warmly with the ipcc chairman dr rk pachauri a real masterpiece..............

now giong for the left over balancing part in kdm.......little bit interesting. :)

well today was a little better day, got the admit card without any hassles, but got no time to studies, this formatting thing of the system is boring and that to becomes irritatingwhen you got to format it when the OS is blocked by these microsoft fellas everytime when try to download virtual xp software.

now going to study belts rather boring one...........

well today was also one of the boring days of all, whipped from parents for exploiting use of laptop, akshat once again duped us, got the admit card, prajapati talked with me in a kind of bullying tone, getting nervous for exams,

god help me out!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!